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In recent years, a large body  of research,  dating  back  to Hartman (1984, 
1985), has  focused on the effects of  taxation  on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into and from the United States. For the most part, this literature has 
related capital flows to some measure of  an effective tax rate on capital in- 
come. The empirical results relating to inward FDI,  on which we shall con- 
centrate in this paper, have been mixed. Although there is some evidence that 
tax rates affect investment, there has been little robustness to such findings. 
We argue below that this lack of satisfactory results may be due, in part, to 
the fact that past efforts have typically studied financial flows rather than in- 
vestment itself and have failed to account adequately for the different methods 
foreign multinationals can use to invest in the United States, each of which 
carries its own particular tax implications. By lumping together all forms of 
investment and relating this aggregate value to some measure of the U.S. tax 
rate, previous researchers have obscured the possible impact of taxation on 
foreign investment. 
A foreign multinational seeking to undertake real investment in the United 
States can do so in three different ways: it can acquire an existing U.S. com- 
pany, establish a new U.S. branch or subsidiary, or invest through an affiliate 
branch or subsidiary already operating in U. S. markets. The relevant tax fac- 
tors  affecting  the decision  of  the  multinational  depend not  only upon  the 
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source of funds and the home country’s tax rules, two factors which previous 
authors have  emphasized,  but  also  critically upon  the  chosen method  of 
undertaking the investment. Although most authors have modeled the taxation 
of FDI as if  it proceeded through the acquisition of  new capital goods, the 
predominant channel of FDI actually has been through mergers and acquisi- 
tions. This distinction is of particular importance for the interpretation of re- 
cent FDI behavior. 
In a provocative work, Scholes and Wolfson (1991) argue that the Tax Re- 
form Act of  1986 (TRA86) provided a strong incentive for foreign multina- 
tionals to increase their investment activity in the United States. The authors’ 
argument rests  upon  the  observation that  foreign companies whose home 
countries credit U.S. taxes (those with so-called worldwide tax systems) are 
relatively unaffected by increases in U.S. taxes because any payments made 
are credited at home upon repatriation. Because TRA86 raised effective tax 
rates on certain corporate assets, the relative (to domestic U.S. investors) tax 
position of these selected foreign investors may have improved. Scholes and 
Wolfson offer stylized evidence that the boom in investment predicted by these 
tax effects has actually occurred, and Swenson (1989) provides some support- 
ing evidence with respect to the recent pattern of  FDI across industries and 
countries.  We  reevaluate the Scholes-Wolfson hypothesis in this paper be- 
cause we view it as a litmus test for the importance of taxes in determining 
FDI into the United States and because we feel that econometric analysis in 
the spirit of earlier studies would be difficult to interpret given the limited 
sample sizes and clear nonstationarity in the variables we feel are important. 
As we  shall discuss below, a significant part of  the FDI boom of the late 
1980s came through takeovers rather than through the purchase of new assets. 
Yet, given the distinct tax treatment of  takeovers (as opposed to new invest- 
ment) and the additional provisions of TRA86 regarding takeovers, it is ques- 
tionable whether the  boom  in  FDI  is  really  consistent with  the  1986 tax 
changes. In particular, it is not clear that tax factors would predict an increase 
in FDI generally or a relative increase in FDI from home countries following 
a worldwide tax system. We  demonstrate this point using a model of  FDI 
developed in Section 4.4. In light of  the model’s implications, we  consider 
the recent patterns of FDI and argue that the evidence of a tax-induced boom 
after 1986 is not as strong as others have suggested it to be. 
4.1  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
Foreign direct investment into the United States has been the subject of  a 
burgeoning empirical literature. Table 4.1 suggests why.  The last column of 
the table presents annual flows of FDI, the data series studied by most of the 
previous empirical efforts examining inbound FDI.’ This series grew at an 
1. In addition to the papers already mentioned, the literature attempting to explain inward FDI 
includes Boskin and Gale (1987), Froot and Stein (1989). and Newlon (1987). For an excellent 
and comprehensive review of the literature, see Slemrod (1990b). 121  Taxation and Foreign Direct lnvestment in the U.S. 
Table 4.1  FDI investment in the US.,  by Year ($ millions) 
Investment Type 
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Source: Survey of  Current Business, various issues. 
Note: NA  = Not available. 
average annual rate of  18 percent between  1980 and  1989 before dropping 
sharply in 1990. 
One drawback of  the use of  capital flow data is that they are not directly 
related  to the  actual physical  investment  of  interest  to  the  researcher and 
on which are based the theoretical models used to form effective tax rates. 
For example, if  a foreign company borrows in the United States in order to 
purchase a machine, the transaction will not appear in the capital flow data. 
Quijano (1990, 33, tab. 4) reports that roughly 81 percent of debt financing 
of  U.S. affiliates occurs through U.S. sources of funds, suggesting that this 
omission may be quite important. Although payments to cover the borrowing 
by the foreign parent will appear in the flow data, the timing of the investment 
will be obscured, and any relationship  between the tax treatment of invest- 
ment in a particular year and the observed flow series may be spurious.* 
Alternative measures of FDI that are in some respects closer to the desired 
measure are given  in the first three columns of table 4.1. The first is total 
investment in plant and equipment undertaken by foreign affiliates, the second 
is the total value of U.S. firms acquired by foreign companies, and the third is 
the value of foreign branches and subsidiaries newly established by  foreign 
companies. 
2. There are other possible shortcomings  of the flow data. Firms from territorial countries (those 
not receiving credits for U.S. taxes at home) might have a higher incentive to borrow in the United 
States to avoid U.S. taxes, so we might expect the flow data to systematically understate their 
investment relative to that from worldwide countries. 
3. For a useful discussion of the differences in coverage of the different measures, see Quijano 
(1990). The balance-of-payments  flow data and affiliate financial and operating data track the 
behavior of existing U.S. affiliates of foreign corporations. The acquisition and establishment data 
survey existing U.S. companies acquired by foreign investors, and new companies established by 
foreign investors. The reported affiliate investment here is affiliate investment in new plant and 122  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
Each of  these alternative measures also shows a striking increase in the 
1980s. Affiliate investment grew approximately 13 percent a year from 1980 
to  1989, while establishment investment grew at a rate of  15 percent. FDI 
through acquisition of existing U.S.  assets grew approximately 23 percent a 
year over the  same period,  suggesting that  the  U.S.  merger boom  of  the 
eighties was not confined to domestic parents. In our view, it is the plant and 
equipment investment by  affiliates plus the establishment of  new operations 
that correspond most closely to the theory on which past studies have been 
based, since these studies have generally ignored the special tax provisions 
affecting the acquisition of existing companies or their assets. Yet, by  1988, 
these two categories combined accounted for less foreign direct investment 
than did acquisitions. 
4.2  Tax Tkeatment of FDI 
The tax treatment of foreign-source income can be very complicated, mak- 
ing empirical study difficult. Countries generally treat foreign-source income 
in one of two ways. A “territorial,” or source-based, approach involves taxing 
only home-source income, essentially exempting from domestic tax the in- 
come a domestic multinational earns on its operations abroad. For companies 
based  in territorial countries,  the relevant corporate tax provisions directly 
relating to investment are clearly those imposed by the host country. 
At the other extreme is the “worldwide” approach that adopts the residence 
principle of  taxation, whereby the home country attempts to tax the world- 
wide income of  its companies, normally offering a credit for income taxes 
already paid on such income abroad. In principle, the income of  companies 
based  in  worldwide countries faces a tax  burden determined by  the home 
country’s tax  provisions,  since  foreign taxes  are  simply  offset  by  credits 
against the home country’s taxes. This is the essence of the Scholes-Wolfson 
argument. 
In practice, of  course, there are many additional provisions that attenuate 
this sterilization of  a worldwide multinational’s foreign tax burden. First, if 
the foreign tax rate exceeds that of the home country, there will typically be 
excess foreign tax credits, making the marginal tax burden dependent on the 
foreign tax provisions, as with territorial home countries. Second, in practice 
the residence principle is commonly applied only upon the repatriation of in- 
come. As with the taxation of a corporation’s dividends upon their payment, 
equipment only. If  an affiliate purchases an existing U.S.  firm, this shows up in the acquisition 
data. (Appendix A discusses further the sources of the data presented in the tables.) 
The total of the three investment  series, given in the fourth column of table 4.1,  is roughly 
double the flow series given in the last column. This reflects both the absence of domestically 
financed capital from the flow series and the fact that some of the domestic affiliates are only 
partially owned by foreign investors. Moreover, the flow data net out sales of domestic firms back 
to domestic parents.  Still, we view  the affiliate, acquisition,  and establishment data as more 
closely related to business fixed investment activity. 123  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.  S. 
the additional taxes paid upon repatriation may have no effect on investment 
financed by  retained earnings,  a point first made in the foreign context by 
Hartman (1985). 
Beginning with Hartman’s work, much of  the empirical literature on FDI 
into the United States has focused on the distinction between retained earnings 
and transfers. The theory suggests that U. S. tax provisions should matter least 
for the investment from worldwide countries that is financed by transfers, but 
the empirical evidence offers, at best, weak support. Indeed, Slemrod (1990b) 
finds that the transfer of funds is described well by tax and return variables but 
that retention of earnings is not. 
A  possible problem with  this  literature is the dependence on flow  data 
which, as discussed above, do not necessarily correspond to investment itself. 
One study, by Swenson (1989), used the acquisition and establishment data 
(given in the second and third columns of table 4.1) and did find some evi- 
dence that average U.S. tax rates are positively correlated with inbound FDI, 
as the Scholes-Wolfson hypothesis would suggest. However, Swenson also 
found a negative impact of the effective marginal tax rate, a result difficult to 
reconcile with the apparent theory. We  believe part of  this puzzle  may be 
traced to the lack of attention to the alternative modes of foreign direct invest- 
ment. That is, the effective tax rates used by Swenson should not be expected 
to describe acquisition activity well. 
As indicated above, the theoretical discussion and empirical analysis of the 
impact of taxation on FDI has treated the problem as one of  acquiring new 
capital, even though this is only one of the possible modes. The other impor- 
tant mode is the acquisition of an existing U.S. company. The mode of invest- 
ment chosen affects tax  liability differently because the choice to acquire a 
U.S.  company will depend on the U.S. merger laws governing, for example, 
step-up in basis and transfer of tax benefits, whereas investment in new capital 
will depend on the statutory tax rate, the investment tax credit, and deprecia- 
tion schedules.  Because the tax burden  incurred depends upon the method 
chosen and the investor doing the choosing,  it makes little sense to  group 
these forms of investment together and relate them to a single tax variable, as 
has frequently been done in the past. 
A firm can choose to acquire another in the United States in a number of 
ways. The first choice is whether to acquire with cash or in exchange for the 
shares of the acquirer, and the second choice is whether to acquire the shares 
or assets of the target. If an exchange of shares is chosen, the deal may com- 
pletely avoid immediate tax consequences, with the depreciable basis of the 
acquired corporation being absorbed into the acquirer and, in general, the 
U.S. shareholder that sells the stock deferring tax liability until such time as 
the shares received in exchange are sold. The tax basis of the new stock is the 
same as that of the relinquished stock, and tax is paid upon realization of  any 
gains.4 
4. This  is generally the case if the acquisition qualified as a “B” or  “C’  reorganization, so 
designated because the relevant code is section 268(a)( 1) (B) or (C) of the Internal Revenue Code. 124  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
In  a sample we  have constructed, virtually all foreign acquisitions were 
financed with cash throughout the 1980s. If the acquirer chooses to pay cash 
or a combination of stock and cash for the stock of the target, there will gen- 
erally be no deferral of shareholder capital gains tax. However, there is still 
the choice of  whether to acquire the company as a going concern or a collec- 
tion of assets. If the acquirer chooses to perform a corporate stock acquisition, 
the U.S. tax attributes of the acquired company will be inherited by  the cor- 
poration, without any immediate corporate-level taxation.  Alternatively, the 
parent company can acquire the assets of  the target, either explicitly or by 
electing to treat a stock acquisition as an asset acquisition via section 338 of 
the Internal Revenue Code. In this case, the acquirer can step up the basis of 
the depreciable assets of the target, but in order to do so the liquidating cor- 
poration must pay some corporate tax on the basis step-up, and no transfer of 
net operating losses is allowed. 
To  the extent that an acquiring foreign corporation is influenced only by 
U.S. taxes at the margin (the territorial case), the incentives it faces in decid- 
ing how to structure a deal are similar to those facing a U.S. parent. In the 
other extreme (worldwide)  case, in which U.S. taxes are absorbed by tax cred- 
its at home, there seems less reason to opt for the basis step-up, because this 
provides no ultimate tax relief but does require the payment of  taxes by  the 
liquidating corporation. 
4.3  Tax Reform Act of 1986 
The passage of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 brought several changes in the 
taxation of U.S. corporate investment. The literature on FDI has focused pri- 
marily on the reduced investment incentives and the apparent advantages this 
offers worldwide countries (see, for example, Scholes and  Wolfson  1991; 
Slemrod 1990a; and Swenson 1989). However, TRA86 also introduced im- 
portant changes in the tax treatment of mergers and acquisitions. 
Prior to  1986, the General Utilities doctrine allowed firms electing to ac- 
quire the assets of the target to step up the basis of  the acquired assets while 
Since 1986, the tax losses of the acquired firm will be available only for restricted use, subject 
to the annual limitation that the losses claimed not exceed the value of the target multiplied by the 
federal long-term tax-exempt rate, provided that the acquirer  can show that the acquired firm is an 
“ongoing” enterprise. If the acquired firm is liquidated within two years of the acquisition, the net 
operating losses cannot be used. This limitation on the use of  losses applies to stock acquisitions 
generally, regardless of whether they qualify for treatment as a tax-free reorganization. 
5. Scholes and Wolfson (1991) argue that these transactions might also provide a way for for- 
eign corporations to avoid taxes on an eventual basis step-up by transfemng from the subsidiary 
to a foreign parent the assets initially acquired by a U.S. subsidiary in a stock transaction. How- 
ever, this type of transaction  is taxable under section 367(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
There was some uncertainty as to whether the IRS could enforce this section. Notice 87-5, issued 
at the end of  1986, argued that this treatment violates some tax treaties, but eventually the IRS 
withdrew this notice (Notice 87-66), making clear its commitment to impede such tax avoidance 
strategies. 125  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. 
paying tax only on the recaptured depreciable basis for those assets subject to 
recapture. For example, if  the target had purchased a machine for $50 and 
depreciated it to $10, then the acquirer, upon purchasing the machine for 
$100, was  allowed to claim depreciation allowances on the full $100 after 
paying tax on the $40  of recaptured basis. Some believed this to have provided 
a strong tax incentive for mergers, although aggregate evidence in support of 
this claim is lacking (Auerbach and Reishus 1988). The repeal of this provi- 
sion may have played a role in the enormous surge in acquisition activity in 
the final two quarters of 1986. The removal of the tax gain from basis step-up 
should provide a powerful disincentive for FDI in the form of acquiring U.S. 
firms, at least to the extent that such acquisitions take the form of assets pur- 
chases.6 
In addition to these provisions directly affecting mergers and acquisitions, 
the 1986 act altered the structure of taxation in a way that may indirectly have 
influenced takeovers. In  reducing investment incentives (most importantly 
through the elimination of  the investment tax credit) and at the same time 
reducing the corporate rate, TRA86 sharply narrowed the distinction in the 
treatment of new and existing assets, providing apparently large windfalls to 
the value of existing firms. In theory, this represents a large tax-induced in- 
crease in the price of firms and should have influenced the incentives to pur- 
chase such firms-particularly  for the worldwide company, which by assump- 
tion cannot obtain the offsetting benefits of reduced domestic taxation of the 
existing capital it purchases. 
In summary, there are three sets of  U.S. tax provisions relevant to FDI: 
those that apply to new capital, those that apply to mergers and acquisitions, 
and  those affecting existing assets. Quantifying the relative importance of 
these effects requires an explicit model of the FDI process. 
4.4  A Model of Foreign Investment 
In this section, drawing heavily on Auerbach (1989), we introduce a model 
which allows us to derive effective tax rates for foreign firms interested in 
acquiring U.S. assets. In this model, there are three types of firms: domestic, 
foreign territorial (which are subject only to U.S. taxes), and foreign world- 
wide (which, at the margin, are not affected by U.S. taxes they pay). 
The model proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the representative do- 
mestic firm acts much like the firm in  Auerbach (1989), maximizing value 
subject to a constant-returns-to-scale production function with quadratic ad- 
justment  costs  of  investment  and  potentially  changing  taxes.  Given  the 
constant-returns technology, the determinacy of equilibrium is provided by an 
endogenous price of output, which varies inversely with the level of aggregate 
6. Good information on the fraction of transactions by foreign parents taking this form is not 
available. 126  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
production. The domestic firm’s optimization problem leads to a system of 
first-order differential equations in the capital stock K and the shadow value of 
new capital, q, which we linearize in order to solve. The solution for the path 
of K and q also provides a path for the output price, p.  The combination of q 
and U.S. tax provisions determine the price of existing capital, qK. 
In the model’s second stage, the foreign firm observes the equilibrium path 
of  q, p,  and q“  determined by the domestic firm and decides, in light of the 
tax provisions that it faces, how  much capital to acquire at each instant. In 
order to make the problem tractable, we assume that the foreign firm’s deci- 
sion to acquire domestic capital has no effect on domestic output or price and 
that the foreign firm distributes its new purchases between existing and new 
capital subject to an exogenously given proportion, p.’ This approach incor- 
porates the idea that, in order to grow within the United States, foreign firms 
may need to grow extensively as well as intensively, thereby establishing a 
toehold in new markets.8 
We model behavior as if a steady state existed in  1986 and consider change 
in the rate of investment after the passage of TRA86, which change we treat 
as unanticipated and permanent. To  obtain relatively simple expressions for 
the level of FDI, we make a variety of  additional simplifying assumptions 
(discussed in detail in Appendix B), where the following expressions are de- 
rived for FDI by worldwide and territorial companies, respectively (with “*” 
representing a steady-state value around which the linearization takes place): 
and 
where A, (< 0) is the stable root of the domestic corporation’s capital accu- 
mulation problem; + is the domestic firm’s adjustment cost parameter (+F 
being the corresponding value for the foreign firm)i q is the elasticity of  de- 
mand for output; p is the firm’s real discount rate; 6 = [S(l - 6+/2)]  is an 
adjusted rate of economic depreciation; IT  is the rate of inflation; and p is the 
7. When a foreign firm purchases old capita) (i.e., an existing U.S.  firm), the transaction is 
simply a change in ownership and should obey our assumptions. When a foreign firm purchases 
new capital, however, this could, in principle, change domestic output and price unless the foreign 
investment is quite small relative to domestic investment. 
8. While p may range between zero and one in the model, it does not vary over time. Thus, we 
have not incorporated the possibility that p may depend upon a foreign corporation’s domestic 
experience, with relative newcomers perhaps more likely to weigh takeovers heavily at first. We 
return to this issue below (see footnote 13). 127  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S 
fraction of  FDI done in the form of  acquisition (as opposed to new capital 
purchases). 
The remaining terms in these two equations all relate to changes in U.S. 
taxation, with k the investment tax credit, r the present value of depreciation 
allowances, and 6’ the rate at which assets are written off  for tax purposes. 
The term u is the proportional change in the domestic effective tax rate asso- 
ciated with TRA86, while B is the proportional change in the relative value of 
old to new capital. In general, B > 0 because the act raised the relative val- 
uation of existing assets. If the cost of capital increased, then a > 0 as well. 
Note that B appears only in the first expression, since territorial firms are as- 
sumed to get the benefits of  the reduced taxation of  existing assets that the 
price reflects. Worldwide firms, on the other hand, must pay for these benefits 
but do not, by assumption, receive them: the reduced U.S. tax burden simply 
leads to increased taxes at home. 
The other major difference between the two expressions is in the sign of the 
term multiplying the expression (uA1+/q), which relates to the decline in do- 
mestic capital accumulation. For worldwide firms, there are two effects, both 
of  which increase investment (for a > 0). The first, (-A,/p),  is associated 
with the rise in prices coming from the reduction in the scale of  domestic 
operations. The second comes from the decline in q and reflects the benefits 
of a reduction in the price of capital goods acquired through existing compa- 
nies, holding the relative valuation of new and existing goods constant. 
For the temtorial firm, the overall effect is negative unless p = 1, since 
the increase in p  results from the reduced domestic incentive to invest, to 
which territorial firms are also subject. Indeed, when  p = 0, the territorial 
firm’s problem is essentially the same as that of the domestic firm. However, 
as p -  1, the impact of the U.S. tax increase is muted by the offsetting benefit 
of the decline in q. 
In summary, the impact of TRA86 on the FDI of territorial firms should go 
in the same direction as domestic investment, although these firms will face 
no disincentive to the extent that FDI occurs through the acquisition of firms 
rather than new capital. Hence, for assets facing a higher cost of capital, FDI 
should be discouraged in general but should shift toward acquisitions. The 
impact on the FDI of worldwide firms is of a more ambiguous nature for those 
assets for which investers face an increased cost of capital, as the reduction in 
domestic investment activity should encourage entry but the higher valuation 
of existing capital should discourage it. As long as the net effect of  the tax 
reform is to increase the value of domestic firms (i.e., the terms multiplying 
p have a positive sum), worldwide firms will have an incentive to shift their 
activity away from  acquisition^.^ 
9. We  note, however, that  this conclusion regarding the relative shift toward acquisitions by 
territorial companies ignores the possibility that worldwide and territorial companies’  acquisitions 
may also have been affected by the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, the effects of which 
our model does not include. 128  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
The sign of the impact of TRA86 on investment by worldwide companies 
is an empirical question, which can be elucidated by considering several ex- 
amples motivated by the tax treatment of different assets and the actual distri- 
butions of FDI among the alternative modes of  investment. Table 4.2 reports 
the results of  simulations of  the effect of  the tax reform on FDI for various 
assumptions about the relevant parameters. The numbers given in the table are 
the initial change in the investment-capital  ratio associated with the 1986 tax 
change, multiplied by the foreign adjustment cost parameter h.  That is, one 
should divide the given number by one’s estimate of +F to obtain an estimated 
first-year change in the investment-capital  ratio. 
The top panel displays the results for hypothetical worldwide firms; the 
bottom panel gives comparable results for territorial firms. For our simula- 
tions, we considered four types of asset: equipment, structures, land, and in- 
tangibles. Equipment, which depreciates relatively rapidly and received the 
investment tax credit before 1986, typifies the investment that should have 
been discouraged by TRA86 and perhaps been made more attractive to world- 
wide investors. Structures, at least those in the corporate sector, were treated 
relatively favorably by the  1986 act.Io Land is not depreciable for tax pur- 
poses, whereas the creation of intangibles (as, for example, through advertis- 
ing) may generally be expensed. 
For each asset and country type, we consider a range of potential values for 
the fraction of FDI taking the form of mergers and acquisitions (p) and for the 
quadratic adjustment cost term facing domestic investors (+). For p, we con- 
sider values of 0 (all direct purchases of new capital), 1 (all takeovers), and 
0.5 (a reasonable value, given the relative importance of the two methods 
indicated in table 4.1). For +, we consider values of  5 and  15, meant to rep- 
resent reasonably low and high levels of adjustment costs. 
Let us consider first the results for territorial firms. Recall that, since the 
value of existing capital reflects its future productivity, the net effect of any of 
the tax changes is zero if p = 1. For the intermediate value of p, 0.5, we can 
see that the tax reform provided a disincentive for equipment investment and 
increased incentives for investment in structures and land (since Q > 0 for 
these assets). For intangibles, there is no effect because our assumption of 
immediate expensing makes the cost of capital impervious to the corporate tax 
rate. When p = 0, the effects of the reform are even stronger but in the same 
direction. In general, territorial firms’ investment in equipment should shift 
toward acquisition and away from new investment after 1986. 
The results  for  worldwide  firms reflect the  offsetting effects described 
above. The results are generally opposite those of the territorial firms, as only 
investment in equipment may have been encouraged by the 1986 act. Invest- 
10. The effect of lengthened depreciation lifetimes was more than offset by the reduction in the 
corporate tax rate. We have not attempted to quantify the impact of other provisions, such as the 
strengthened corporate minimum tax. 129  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. 
Table 4.2  Effects of Changes in the Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment 
+=5;p=  + = 15; p = 
0  .5  1  0  .5  1 
Worldwide Countries 
Equipment  ,214  ,136  ,058  ,034  -  ,103  -  .240 
Structures  -  ,171  -  ,222  -  ,273  -  ,121  -.190  -  .258 
Land  -  .I16  -  ,149  -.182  -  ,085  -  .I34  -.182 
Intangibles  0  -.I11  -  .222  0  -.111  -  ,222 
Territorial Countries 
0  .5  1  0  .5  1 
Equipment  -  ,060  -  ,030  0  -  ,042  -  ,021  0 
Structures  .068  .034  0  .099  .050  0 
Land  ,065  ,033  0  ,096  ,048  0 
Intangibles  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Note: Table 4.2 records values of textequation (1). For equipment, the parameters assumed are 
7~ = .04,  p = .04, 6' = 2, q = 1, and +F  = 1. For structures, we assume the same, except 
that 6 = ,033 and 6' = .05. For land, 6 = 6' = 0.  For intangibles, 6 = .09,  6' = m. The 
values of 6 for equipment and structures are taken from Auerbach and Hines (1987). 
ment in land and structures was doubly discouraged, because these assets re- 
ceived both  windfalls to the value of  existing capital and reductions in the 
effective tax rate on new investment. Hence, these assets would have cost 
more  (to the extent acquired via takeover) and returned less,  as domestic 
investors were encouraged to invest. Investment in intangibles was discour- 
aged because of the windfall to existing capital, with no offsetting effect com- 
ing from changes in the tax treatment of new investment. Only for equipment 
could the higher price of existing capital have been offset by higher returns in 
the future, and the table indicates that for this to occur would have required 
a combination of  low adjustment costs (so that domestic investment would 
drop and before-tax returns to capital rise quickly) and a high fraction of 
capital purchased directly rather than through mergers and acquisitions. In- 
deed,  for  the  high-adjustment-cost case  with  half  of  all  capital  acquired 
through takeover,  all types of  investment by  worldwide  investors are dis- 
couraged, and even equipment investment is discouraged more than for terri- 
torial investors. 
Hence, the notion of worldwide investors rushing in to own domestic capi- 
tal requires a very particular alignment of assumptions about the type of capi- 
tal being acquired, the mode in which it is acquired, and the speed with which 
domestic investors leave the market to make foreign entry attractive. In all of 
the cases, however, worldwide companies should have been encouraged to 
shift their mode of investment from acquisitions of  companies to direct pur- 
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In summary, we can conclude the following from the simulations in table 
4.2: Relative to territorial firms, worldwide firms should have  shifted their 
investment toward equipment and utilized the takeover route less often. The 
overall impact on investment by  territorial firms should have been negative, 
but  unless a preponderant share of  FDI by  worldwide companies took the 
form of purchases of new equipment, these firms' overall incentive for invest- 
ment should also have decreased. We  can evaluate these predictions using a 
variety of data on the composition and level of FDI before and after TRA86. 
4.5  Recent FDI Experience 
Tables 4.3 through 4.5 record the FDI data by country and type of  invest- 
ment from 1980 to 1989. All three tables report investment both for the major 
worldwide countries, the United Kingdom and Japan, and for the major terri- 
torial  countries,  Canada,  France,  West  Germany,  and  the  Netherlands.  'I 
Clearly, the sharp increase observed in table 4.1 is also evident in table 4.3, 
with virtually every country experiencing growth in affiliate FDI both before 
and after TRA86. The growth rates from 1986 to 1989 were large for all coun- 
tries. Japanese affiliate FDI grew 98 percent over this period; U.K. affiliate 
FDI grew 62 percent. The territorial countries experienced a smaller boom, 
with growth rates over the period ranging from 17 percent for the Netherlands 
to 46 percent for West Germany. 
Table 4.4 reports acquisition FDI for the same countries. These series also 
show an increase throughout the sample, but the increases by  the worldwide 
countries, the United Kingdom and Japan, after TRA86 are truly striking. 
From 1986 to 1988, Japanese acquisition activity increased by nearly a factor 
of ten, and British acquisitions increased by a factor of nearly three. The most 
notable event in the territorial data is the large temporary increase in acquisi- 
tions in 1986, something consistent with the view that the suspension of the 
favorable tax treatment of acquisitions induced these firms to get their acqui- 
sitions in under the wire. Table 4.5 reports establishment  FDI, which shows a 
solid increase for worldwide countries but  nothing  striking for territorial 
ones.  l2 
Figures 4.1 through 4.4 record the composition of worldwide and territorial 
11. These characterizations  are taken from Slemrod (1990b). We note, however, that the dis- 
tinction  is not  so clear in reality. Territorial countries  do not necessarily  exempt all types of 
foreign-source income. On the other hand, investors in worldwide countries may face no effective 
tax rate on foreign-source income, because of either excess foreign tax credits or the use of re- 
tained earnings as the marginal source of finance (see section 4.2 above). 
12. It might be  argued that the general increase in FDI during the late  1980s simply reflects 
exchange rate  movements.  To  control for this effect, we recalculated the figures in tables 4.3 
through 4.5  in units of the home currency. Indeed, this did reduce the measured growth rate in 
FDI from 1986 to 1988. The explosion in acquisitions by  worldwide countries stands out even 
more.  Denominated in yen, Japanese acquisitions grew by  a factor of 7.5 from 1986 to  1988, 
while U.K. acquisitions, stated in pounds, grew by a factor of 2.5. 131  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. 
Table 4.3  FDI Amiate Investment by Country of Origin, by Year 
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Table 4.4  FDI Acquisition Investment by Country of Origin, by Year 
(U.S. $ millions) 
Year 
Territorial  Worldwide 
West  United 





















$  516 




















































FDI over the same period.  Figure 4.1 indicates that the proportion of  total 
acquisitions of  U.S. companies accounted for by  worldwide countries leapt 
dramatically after  1986; by  1988, roughly 55 percent of  all acquisitions by 
foreign firms were accounted for by those based in the United Kingdom and 
Japan. Figure 4.2 shows that the gap in affiliate investment between temtorial 
and worldwide countries has been narrowing, and figure 4.3 indicates that 
worldwide countries account for roughly 60 percent of all establishment in- 
vestment by  1988. 
How do these trends mesh with the Scholes-Wolfson hypothesis and the 
predictions of our model? Recall that the model predicts that if there is a boom 132  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
Table 4.5  FDI Establishment Investment by Country of Origin, by  Year 
(U.S. $ millions) 
Territorial  Worldwide 
West  United 
Year  Canada  France  Germany  Netherlands  Japan  Kingdom 
80  $213  $  83  $238  $867  $  75  $  273 
81  984  I04  349  163  147  869 
82  282  124  285  191  450  1,126 
83  354  128  206  132  193  918 
84  402  186  210  102  454  75 1 
85  420  161  127  192  689  708 
86  412  88  184  295  4,166  872 
87  107  96  347  188  3,666  494 
88  198  508  24 1  147  3,956  321 
89  141  146  253  237  4,712  1,611 
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Fig. 4.1  Fraction of total foreign acquisitions in the United States 
in investment by worldwide firms, then it should occur in the form of direct 
purchases of capital, not in acquisitions. Although investment in new capital 
has increased, as reflected in the increased affiliate and establishment invest- 
ment, acquisition  activity  has increased  even  more, something  inconsistent 
with tax factors.13 In fact, as figure 4.4 shows, the proportion of  worldwide 
13. The merger boom might be less damaging if it reflected a choice by new foreign parents to 
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Fig. 4.3  Fraction of total establishment investment 134  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
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Fig. 4.4  Affiliate and establishment FDI relative to total 
investment accounted for by affiliate and establishment investment dropped 
precipitously after the 1986 reform, going from roughly 60 percent in 1986 to 
only 35 percent in 1988. 
More consistent with the model is the shift of territorial investment toward 
acquisitions, although the trend is not as clear-cut. The 1987 proportion of 
new investment is slightly less than that in  1985, and a large decline followed 
in 1988. 
Figure 4.5 plots the share that U.S.-bound FDI has in total overflows from 
the territorial and worldwide countries.*4  Quite striking is the fact that the 
share of U.S.  investment in total FDI from worldwide countries is roughly 
constant after 1986, suggesting that the boom in investment experienced in 
expansions through the purchase of new equipment. In terms of our model, this would reflect a 
shift over time from a very high to a very low value of p. If this effect were powerful, then the 
boom in foreign merger activity could have been a signal of intended further expansion through 
purchases of new equipment. 
To examine this hypothesis, we calculated the percentage of acquisitions by new acquirers, for 
each year in a sample described below, of U.S. firms acquired by foreign parents. The ratio of 
new entrant to total acquisitions is uniformly high throughout the eighties and increases from 
roughly 0.7 in 1985 to 0.99 in 1986 and 0.93 in 1987. Thus, the jump appears a year too early to 
be consistent with this view. 
14. Unfortunately, data on the breakdown of these flows among the various modes of invest- 
ment (acquisition, establishment, and direct capital purchase) are not available. 135  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S 
Fig. 4.5  U.S. inflow as  fraction of foreign outflows 
the United States is just part of a broader increase in foreign investment activ- 
ity by  these countries. The U.S. share in total investment by territorial coun- 
tries shows a slight increase in  1987, followed by  a decline in  1988 and an 
increase in  1989. For the period  1987-89,  there is no clear trend in either 
investment share. The results do not  offer much  support for the  Scholes- 
Wolfson predictions of a surge in U.S.-bound tax-driven FDI. 
Additional evidence comes from the industrial composition of FDI. Our 
model suggests that firms from worldwide countries should have faced poten- 
tial tax incentives to invest in the United States only in equipment. While we 
do not  have detailed investment data on types of  assets purchased, we do 
know the industrial composition of FDI and the asset mix of different indus- 
tries. In particular, manufacturing is the major equipment-intensive sector in 
which FDI occurs. 
Table 4.6  presents the proportion of total FDI inflow accounted for by  in- 
vestment in the manufacturing sector for the major foreign investors into the 
United States. Consistent with the theory, the proportion of  FDI in manufac- 
turing for worldwide companies has increased dramatically since 1986, going 
from 0.430 in 1986 to 0.780 in 1989 for the United Kingdom and from 0.129 
to 0.292 in the same years for Japan. Contrary to the theory, the same upward 
trend generally occurs for territorial FDI in manufacturing as well. It is diffi- 
cult, considering the two together, to judge whether the switch to manufactur- 136  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
Table 4.6  Proportion of FDI Flow in Manufacturing 
Territorial  Worldwide 
Year  Canada 
81  ,306 
82  1* 
83  1* 
84  ,225 
85  ,852 
86  .486 
87  .682 
88  ,498 
89  .748 
West  United 
France  Germany  Netherlands  Japan  Kingdom 
I*  .I59  ,315  ,097  ,307 
I*  ,062  ,209  .I55  ,218 
1*  ,299  ,494  ,005  ,194 
O*  O*  ,290  ,138  ,099 
I*  ,628  ,193  ,087  ,395 
I*  .541  O*  ,129  ,430 
,617  ,641  .430  ,233  .452 
I*  1*  ,435  ,380  ,526 
,752  ,448  ,556  ,292  ,780 
Source: Unpublished Bureau of Economic Analysis data. 
*Items for which the value is outside the range of 0-1.  This can occur because the flow data are 
based on inbound FDI net of transfers out of the United States. 
ing by worldwide firms was caused by TRA86 or if  the swing toward manu- 
facturing is just  part  of  a  general trend  toward  increased  manufacturing 
investment by foreign countries. 
An alternative source of information about the mix of assets acquired is the 
balance  sheets of  U.S.  companies themselves. For  the  period  1980:l  to 
1990:4, we compiled a sample of 243 companies acquired by foreign parents. 
As  a control, we  also compiled a sample of  4,485 companies acquired by 
domestic parents. For each company with available data, we  calculated the 
fraction of equipment and structures in their overall fixed capital stock in the 
year before the acquisition. In table 4.7, these fractions are aggregated into 
the pre- and post-1986 periods for the sample of  firms acquired by  foreign 
worldwide and temtorial parents, for the Compustat universe of firms, and for 
domestic acquisitions. 
As the table clearly shows, the fraction of structures rose and that of equip- 
ment fell for two of  the three target groups, while the fraction for all firms 
changed little.I5 While the results for the different target groups are similar, 
we note that it was among temtorial, not worldwide, firms that the share of 
equipment rose. The similarity across worldwide and territorial targets is con- 
sistent with our model of the effects of the 1986 act, but it offers no support 
for the view that the post-1986 surge in acquisitions by worldwide firms was 
driven by tax-induced bargains in equipment investment. For example, under 
the high-adjustment-cost scenario, assuming an adjustment cost parameter of 
fifteen and allowing the fraction of acquisitions in total FDI to be one, world- 
15. When weighted averages were used, the ratios were not significantly different from the full 
sample means, because of the huge influence of a small number of  very large targets. 137  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. 
Table 4.7  Structures and Equipment as a Share of Capital Stock, by Qpe of 
Acquisition pre- and post-TRASQ  (unweighted, by all files) 
Before TRA86  After TRA86 
r-statistic  r-statistic 













.262  ,126  - 
.330  3.08 
,259 
.305 
,521  -.633 
,527  -.768 
,543 
,519 
1.64  .309  1.41  - 
1.19  ,346  2.17  - 
,254 
,362 
,077  ,553  ,092 
.048  ,512  -.809 
,549 
.488 
1.25  1.00 
-.358  ,219 
1.34  ,579 
,472  -.161 
*Testing the difference from the full sample means. 
t Testing the difference from the domestic acquisition means. 
$Testing the difference between the two periods. 
wide firms investment in equipment and in structures is deterred to roughly 
the same degree. 
4.6  Conclusion 
This paper presents a model of FDI that takes into account the different tax 
treatments of acquisition of  old and new capital in order to isolate more pre- 
cisely the effects of taxation on FDI into the United  States.  Our simulation 
results suggest that the Tax Reform Act of  1986 generally decreased invest- 
ment incentives for worldwide countries in all assets other than equipment and 
that the sign of the effect on equipment depends upon assumptions about ad- 
justment costs and the proportion of investment accounted for by acquisitions. 
The model also suggests that TRA86 provided an incentive for territorial 
firms to invest relatively less in equipment and relatively  more in structures 
and land.  Also, acquisitions  by companies  from worldwide countries  were 
generally discouraged by the tax reform. 
Examination of recent trends suggests that many of the changes in the com- 
position of FDI predicted by either Scholes and Wolfson (1992) or our model 
have not occurred, casting doubt on the position that the recent boom in for- 
eign direct investment is due to the changes in tax incentives brought about by 
TRA86. Other factors, such as exchange rate movements and the liberaliza- 
tion of capital markets  (see, e.g., Froot and Stein  1989) may have played a 138  Alan J. Auerbach and  Kevin Hassett 
role in the process. In future work using panel data, we hope to examine in 
more detail the characteristics of U.S. firms acquired by foreign multination- 
als in order to understand more fully the impact of taxation on FDI. 
Appendix A 
Data Sources 
The FDI data are taken from various issues of the Survey of  Current Business 
and from floppy diskettes provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
The means-of-payment data for foreign acquisitions were constructed as 
follows. A list of foreign acquisitions was constructed from MLR Publishing’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions:  The Journal of  Corporate Venture. The means of 
payment  for  each  acquisition  was  then  taken  from  Commerce  Clearing 
House’s Capital Changes Reporter 
The means-of-payment data for domestic acquisitions were purchased from 
MLR Publishing. 
The investment outflow data were taken from the International  Financial 
Statistics Yearbook, 1990. 
The numbers reported in table 4.7 are the ratios of  Compustat data items 
156 (machinery and equipment-net)  and 155 (buildings-net)  to data item 
8 (property plant  and equipment-total  net).  Data from the industrial, re- 
search, and full coverage files were used to construct the full sample means. 
Appendix B 
A Model of FDI 
This appendix presents a model in which the various effects of  taxation on 
foreign  direct  investment  may  be  measured  and  compared.  The  analysis 
closely follows that  in Auerbach (1989), Where possible,  we  will  use the 
same notation and omit steps in the derivation that follow from this earlier 
treatment. 
We  assume that U.S. firms are price takers and that they invest subject to a 
constant-returns-to-scale  production  function  in  capital  alone,  subject  to 
quadratic adjustment costs. Foreign firms invest in the United States only via 
takeover (an assumption we will relax later), with these acquisitions also sub- 
ject to adjustment costs. This means that one may separate the questions of 
investment and ownership, with the former being determined by  U.S. firms 
and the latter by foreign firms. 139  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S 
Domestic Firms 
The assumption of the model give rise to a system of differential equations 
in the capital stock, K, and the shadow value of new capital, q. Linearizing 
the model and substituting for q yields 
where  p is the firm’s real discount rate,  is the quadratic adjustment cost 
term, 8 = 6(1 - 1/28+)  is an adjusted measure of the depreciation rate 6,  K* 
is the steady-state capital stock, and 
(k* + r*) - (kr + r,)  T* -  7, 
(A2)  1 -  k*  - r*  1 -  T* +  -~  5, = 
Pr  -  P* 
a,--,  (2. 
k, + rc  )  Pr  P,P*  - 
p+6 i-k*-r*  P* 
where k is the investment tax credit, r is the present value of tax savings from 
depreciation, T is the corporate tax rate, p is the relative output price, and the 
superscript asterisk indicates a steady-state value. 
If we assume a constant elasticity demand specification for output, 
K -  K*  P -  P* 
P* 
then (Al)  may be rewritten: 
Assuming that the economy is initially in a steady state at date zero (say 1986) 
and that the tax parameters shift immediately and permanently at that date 
(a, = a),  the solutions for K,  and q, (t 2  0) are 
1 
(A5.  a) 
and 
(A5.b) 
where A, is the stable (< 0) root of equation (A4). Equations (A5) provide the 
typical saddle-path behavior of K and q, with (for a > 0) K steadily falling to 
its new level as q rises steadily back to its long-run value of  1 after jumping 
initially at t  = 0. 140  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
Foreign Firms 
The foreign firm's problem differs in two ways from that of  the domestic 
firm. First,  its acquisition policy has no impact on domestic output in the 
output price, p.  Second, it must acquire capital in the form of firms. Specifi- 
cally, we assume that increases in foreign-owned capital (as opposed to simple 
replacement investment) require the purchase of existing firms and their capi- 
tal. Hence, the price a foreign firm faces for capital (net of adjustment costs) 
is not the new capital goods price,  1, but the value of  the firm, say u (the 
determination of  which will be discussed below). Thus, if  we define pF and 
4'  in a way comparable to p and 4, the foreign firm's behavior will be char- 
acterized by (compare to A1 and A2) 
where 
and HF is defined in parallel fashion to u  in (A2),  = a:  -  q[@,  -  p*)/p*]. 
The cost of capital term in (A7) includes an additional component due to the 
changing price of existing capital, u. 
Because the output price change included in 8'  does not depend on the size 
of  the foreign-owned capital stock, KF,  expression (A6) is a first-order equa- 
tion in K,  yielding the solution at t  = 0: 
which may be broken up into three pieces, using the definition of  BF in (A7), 
due to changes in taxation (a'),  changes in output prices (p),  and changes in 
the cost of  acquiring firms (a,  a).  Only the first two effects are present for 
domestic firms in this model. 
From (A3) and (A5.a), we have 
=  -(1  - ehil)a  , 
Pl -  P* 
P* 
which put into (As) provides the initial change in the rate of FDI due to price 
changes: 
which has the same sign as a. Hence,  a rise in domestic taxes, through  a 
restriction of domestic output and a rise in domestic prices, in itself encour- 141  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. 
ages FDI. However, we must also consider the impact of taxation and the cost 
of acquisitions. Even firms that do not face any direct tax increase at all may 
still face a change in the cost of acquiring capital goods. 
Before proceeding with a full analysis, let us note some additional proper- 
ties of the solution (A8). If we ignore changes in u,  we obtain 
K;  + 8) 
+
  aA,(pF  + 8) ]  _- 
K*'  +'PF(PF  -  A,)  ' 
which adds to (A10) a term reflecting the direct effect of taxation on invest- 
ment (negative if  aF > 0). If  aF = a, this entire term is negative (because 
A, < 0) and may be shown to equal the investment rate for the domestic firm 
if, in addition, p"  = p and +F  = +: for common tax and economic parame- 
ters, only the behavior of the price term u  causes the foreign firm to behave 
differently, adding an additional term to (A1  1). 
What will existing domestic firms cost? Absent taxes, the capital of existing 
firms will have a value of q per unit. If foreign firms actually paid this price, 
the expression for the rate of  foreign investment at date zero would be the 
term in (A1 1) plus 
In this case, assuming that (pF, a')  = (p, a)  yields a solution KFo = 0, the 
changes in q just offset changes in taxes and prices. This is not really surpris- 
ing, because q reflects the present value of after-tax cash flows from new cap- 
ital. 
Even if  we assume for simplicity that pF  = p and +'  = 4, differences in 
tax rules (aF #  a) and the wedge between the costs of firms and new capital 
(a  # q)  will cause Kt #  0. 
Costs of Acquisition 
The effective price of capital to foreign firms, u,  as well as the effective tax 
rate on that capital, which determines aF,  depends on the nature of the acqui- 
sition itself. If  we assume a competitive market for existing firms, then the 
owners of a firm must receive payment equal to the market value of the exist- 
ing capital, which is the firm's only asset. If assets are written off at rate 6' on 
an historical cost basis, then the value of existing capital at date t (assuming it 
was acquired in a steady state) is 
where 7-r is the rate of inflation. Combined with (A5.b), (A13) yields 142  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
I]  + A+l  (4  -  k - T)aeAli  . 
Normally, qK < q, reflecting the relatively favorable treatment of new capital. 
An  important change in  1986 was to lessen the relative burden on existing 
capital, leading to an increase in qK,  given q. 
A remaining element of  the cost of  acquisition involves capital gains and 
recapture taxes. As nearly all FDI acquisitions  use cash as a means of payment 
and do not qualify as reorganizations, selling shareholders are liable for indi- 
vidual capital gains taxes. If  the acquisition is treated as an asset purchase, 
with a step-up in the basis of  assets, the acquired corporation is liable for 
recapture taxes and, since the 1986 repeal of  the General Utilities doctrine, 
for capital gains taxes as well. This change, along with the increase in individ- 
ual capital gains tax rates, should have discouraged acquisitions in general, 
but especially asset acquisitions, for all acquiring parties. 
Because we are interested primarily in the relative incentives for acquirers 
from different countries and  in  whether some foreign parents may  have  an 
increased incentive to acquire US. firms, we  shall concentrate on the most 
favorable assumptions for  foreign  acquisitions in  general,  supposing that 
shareholder capital gains taxes are unimportant and that deals were structured 
as acquisitions of stock to avoid corporate-level taxes. 
These assumptions imply that existing capital costs foreign acquirers qK  per 
unit and that the tax attributes of the acquired firms carry over. For simplicity, 
we shall consider two polar cases: worldwide firms for which direct tax effects 
were not affected by the 1986 act (a,  = 0) and territorial firms for which only 
U.S.  tax parameters matter. 
Worldwide Firms 
Letting u,  = q:  and u* = [l -  k - r*(l  -  8/(8' + IT))] (see A14) yields 
the solution (for a, = 0): 
where 
-(k  - k*) - (r - r*)  1 - 8/(8' + IT)  1 
1 
B= 143  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. 
The first two terms,  representing the effects of  increased output prices and 
reduced capital goods prices  (for a > 0), encourage investment. The last 
term, B, represents the increased cost of existing capital and discourages in- 
vestment. 
Territorial Firms 
Instead of  computing aF for existing capital,  it is easier to note that the 
difference between qK  and q reflects the difference between the tax treatment 
of  existing and new  capital.  Hence,  buying existing capital for qK or new 
capital for q results (for the territorial firm) in the same present value, with 
the difference in future taxes just offsetting the initial difference in price. This 
means that we may replace 6  with q and let aF = a to obtain the solution for 
the territorial firm. Combining (A1 1) and (A12), we obtain 
----+L=-----  -  a  (pF + 8  A+)  a  (pF+ 8 
(bFPF-A,  T  +F  PF -  A,  P -  A, 
(' 
+
 ')'.  As suggested  where the last step uses the fact that A,(p -  A,)  = 
4 
above, if  pF  = p, then the entire expression equals zero. 
Extensions 
If, more generally, we wish to assume that firms obtain a fraction (1 - p) 
of their new capital through the direct purchase of assets, paying a price 1 per 
unit  (net of  adjustment costs) rather than  qK, we  obtain the more  general 
expressions for investment by worldwide and territorial firms: 
K;  Worldwide:  ~  = -- 
K*F 
If  p = 0,  investment  by  worldwide  firms  is  positive if  a > 0  (because 
A, < 0), while investment by territorial firms is negative. As p + 1, invest- 
ment by  territorial firms rises to zero while that of worldwide firms falls, as 
long as qK actually rises. The overall sign of  investment by  worldwide firms 
cannot be unambiguously determined without additional assumptions. In our 
numerical calculations, we assume that pF  = p, which allows us to simplify 
(A15): 144  Alan J. Auerbach and Kevin Hassett 
K:  -  Worldwide: __ - 
K*F 
K; 
Territorial:  ~  = 
K*F 
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Comment  James M. Poterba 
The rapid growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States dur- 
ing the past decade, and particularly since 1985, has energized both academic 
economists and policymakers to search for the underlying cause of this devel- 
opment. One particularly simple and  ingenious explanation, developed by 
Myron Scholes and Mark Wolfson, points to tax policy as a central factor in 
the rise of FDI. Scholes and Wolfson focused on the Tax Reform Act of  1986, 
which raised the effective tax rate on corporate capital in the United States. 
They recognized that such a reform should, in the long run, reduce capital 
intensity and raise the pretax marginal product of capital. Although the result- 
ing after-tax return to U.S. firms would be less than or equal to their return 
prior to the tax change, foreign firms that could credit U.S. taxes against their 
home-country tax liability would actually earn higher after-tax returns. These 
firms would have a substantial incentive to invest in the United States, and 
this could explain the rise in FDI. Previous empirical studies by Joel Slemrod 
and Deborah Swenson support the Scholes-Wolfson analysis and suggest that 
tax changes may have been an important contributor to the increase in FDI. 
In this important paper, Alan Auerbach and Kevin Hassett argue that the 
evidence is actually less convincing than it appears. The authors make two 
significant contributions to our understanding of how tax policy affects foreign 
direct investment. First, they demonstrate marked differences between the in- 
centives for foreign firms to undertake greenfield investments and their incen- 
tives to acquire assets in takeovers. Although the Scholes-Wolfson  hypothesis 
applies to greenfield investment, most of the increase in FDI  during the late 
1980s involved foreign purchases of existing assets and firms. Second, they 
argue that the incentives for foreign investment differ substantially across dif- 
ferent types of  assets, for example, between structures and equipment, and 
that it is difficult to make broad generalizations about the net effect of the Tax 
Reform Act even on the incentives for foreign greenfield investment. The 
Scholes-Wolfson hypothesis is most applicable to investments in equipment. 
For other assets, the authors argue, the Tax Reform Act had much smaller, or 
in  some cases opposite-signed, effects on the incentives for foreign invest- 
ment. 
This paper advances our understanding of  tax incentives for foreign direct 
investment in much the same way  that research on tax loss carryforwards, 
interasset distortions, and expected tax changes has advanced our understand- 
ing of  domestic investment incentives. It demonstrates that firms’ actual in- 
centives are difficult to describe with simple stylizations of the tax system and 
that once we recognize the details it is difficult to draw broad conclusions. 
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The authors also advance the empirical debate on taxes and FDI in a novel 
way, by comparing FDI in the United States by firms from several nations with 
the FDI in other nations by these firms. Whereas the first generation of studies 
on taxation and FDI asked whether inbound FDI from nations with worldwide 
tax systems rose after the Tax Reform Act of  1986, this paper tests whether 
the FDI by  firms in these countries was redirected toward the United States. 
The findings suggest that outbound FDI from these nations increased in the 
United States as well as in other nations during the late 1980s. This empirical 
regularity undermines previous conclusions about the central role of U.S. tax 
policy in the rise of FDI. 
The results in this paper, however, are not conclusive. Because the United 
States was not the only developed nation to reform its tax system during the 
mid-l980s, a definitive analysis of the tax policy and FDI would need to in- 
vestigate whether investment incentives in other nations changed at roughly 
the same time as the changes in U.S. policy. One should also remember that 
conclusions based on very short time series-in  this case, only two years of 
data for the period since 1986-are  likely to be fragile. This is not a criticism 
of the present analysis, since it applies with equal (or greater) force to previ- 
ous studies with strong conclusions about the explanation of rising FDI. 
The findings in this study leave unanswered a basic question. If tax policy 
changes do not explain the rapid increase in FDI during the 1980s, what does? 
There are many explanations of why firms undertake FDI, but relatively few 
of them can account for sharp changes in the flow of such investment during 
short time periods. One possibility is that the worsening U.S. trade deficit in 
the early 1980s brought new pressures for protectionist policies and that for- 
eign firms from countries with large bilateral trade surpluses, such as Japan, 
viewed FDI as a way  to ensure a continued share of  the U.S.  market. This 
may be correct, but it is not clear why such firms would undertake acquisi- 
tions of  U.S. capacity rather than new  construction. A given set of  capital 
assets could exhibit differential productivity under the control of  different 
managers,  but  demonstrating  this  requires  case  study  investigations  of 
changes in operations at foreign-acquired plants. 
A second possible explanation of  the rise in FDI focuses on exchange rate 
fluctuations. Foreign direct investment rose when the dollar fell, suggesting a 
possible link. It is difficult to understand why foreign firms should find acqui- 
sitions of U.S. firms attractive just because the dollar is low. Under standard 
"random walk" models of  exchange rate evolution, a low current exchange 
rate should portend similar rates in the future. Ignoring possible effects of the 
exchange rate on the cash flows of projects within the United States, the rate 
of  return on an investment in U.S.  assets should be roughly independent of 
the exchange rate. 
A more ingenious link between exchange rates and FDI, suggested by Ken- 
neth Froot and Jeremy Stein, builds on recent cash flow models of corporate 
investment. Froot and  Stein argue that because foreign firms with  a fixed 147  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S 
amount of  foreign currency to spend on acquiring U.S. assets can purchase 
more when the dollar is low than when it is high, FDI will rise when the dollar 
falls. This model implies that both U.S. and foreign corporate tax policies 
may have important effects on FDI. In particular, changes in average tax rates 
in the home countries of firms undertaking FDI should affect their cash flow 
and hence their FDI. Shocks to corporate profitability in the home country for 
these firms should have similar effects. 
The current paper underscores the need for additional study of the determi- 
nants of foreign direct investment and, in particular, for further evidence on 
how public policies affect FDI. New data on these questions are accumulating 
at a rapid rate. In the last half-decade, there have been sharp changes in ex- 
change rates, stock market values, and other factors that might affect invest- 
ment incentives of firms in different nations. As data on the patterns of FDI 
become available, it should be possible to provide much more detailed an- 
swers to the questions that motivate this paper. This Page Intentionally Left Blank